“舍利取义”还是“为名所累”？中国情境下高管声誉的双重治理效应及优化路径研究

在中国特殊的制度与文化情境之下，高管声誉如何影响高管行为以及能否发挥显著的治理效应？这是学术界与实践界共同关注的问题。本研究拟在文献分析与理论演绎的基础上，从评价主体（大众媒体与专业机构）与评价性质（美誉度与知名度）两个维度对高管声誉进行深度解构，并将贡献观与能力观相结合，探讨公司外显信息与高管内在能力两类因素对不同高管声誉类型的影响。继而运用深度访谈及案例研究等质性方法对高管声誉的作用机理进行深入阐释。以有效契约假说与寻租效应假说为基础，提出高管声誉的双重效应理论模型，并从价值分配与价值创造两个层面，实证探讨高管声誉对两类代理成本、战略及创新投资决策的双重影响。进一步引入公司权力配置与高管特质（人口统计学特征、个人经历、心理特征）等情境变量，以探讨并提出中国上市公司高管声誉治理效应的优化路径。以期为政策制定者及公司决策者如何通过高管声誉契约设计来激励与约束高管提供有益参考。

In China's special institutional and cultural context, how does executive reputation affect executive behavior and play a significant governance effect? This is the common concern of the academic and practical circles. On the basis of literature analysis and theoretical deduction, we in-depth deconstruct executive reputation based on the two dimensions of evaluation subject (mass media and professional organizations) and evaluation of properties（being known and generalized favorability）. And with the contribution of combining view and ability view, we explore the two kinds of factors (company explicit information and manager inherent ability) how to influence different reputation types of executives. Then we use qualitative methods such as deep interview and case study to explain the mechanism of executive reputation. Based on the effective contract hypothesis and the rent-seeking effect hypothesis, we propose a dual effect theory model of executive reputation. From the two aspects of value distribution and value creation, we study empirically the dual impact of executive reputation on two -level agency costs, strategy and innovation investment decision. We further introduce the situational variables such as company power allocation and executive characteristics (demographic characteristics, personal experience, and psychological characteristics) to explore and put forward the optimized path of Chinese Listed Companies' executive reputation governance effect. It is expected to provide useful references for policymakers and corporate decision-makers to encourage and constrain executives through the design of executive reputation contracts.