动态投资激励与拍卖支付方式选择:均衡分析与机制设计
批准号:
72003207
项目类别:
青年科学基金项目
资助金额:
24.0 万元
负责人:
王大中
依托单位:
学科分类:
微观经济
结题年份:
2023
批准年份:
2020
项目状态:
已结题
项目参与者:
王大中
中文摘要
加快完善资源要素市场化配置体制机制是新时期市场化改革的重要方向。拍卖是促进资源有效配置和改善收益分配的重要机制。资源要素市场化配置中,通常存在事前事后动态激励、各种支付方式并存等特征,本课题从现实情境出发,构建广义支付方式和动态投资激励下的均衡分析和机制设计框架,系统研究拍卖支付方式对动态投激励的影响,比较不同支付方式、不同拍卖机制的效率和收益差异,刻画广义支付方式下满足动态投资激励约束的最优拍卖机制,构建具有现实操作性的实施机制。本课题具有以下创新:(1)视角创新。将不同主体的动态投资引入要素资源的拍卖支付方式选择研究。(2)方法创新。在广义支付方式下考虑动态投资激励约束,刻画相应的虚拟估值。(3)结论创新。厘清拍卖机制收益等价性成立边界,拓展不同支付方式可进行收益排序的条件。本课题研究可为国有资产交易、技术转移转让、土地资源配置、数据要素交易等要素市场化配置提供理论依据和政策建议。
英文摘要
It is of great importance to accelerate and improve the market allocation mechanism of resource factors in the track of market reform. Auction is an important mechanism to promote allocation efficiency and improve revenue distribution. In the market allocation of resource factors, it exhibits the features of dynamic incentives and various forms of payment method. Taking into account of dynamic incentives and endogenous choice of payment methods, this project establishes a framework of equilibrium analysis and mechanism design. This project systematically studies the impacts of auction payment method on dynamic investment incentives, analyzes and compares the efficiency and revenue differences among different payment methods and auction formats, characterizes the optimal auction mechanisms with general payment methods and dynamic investment incentive compatibility and constructs implementation mechanism that of practical value. This project would have the following contributions: (1) Innovative perspective. It will incorporate the multi-agent dynamic investments into the security-bid auctions, enriches security-bid auction theory and the optimal mechanism design. (2) Methodology contribution. This project will apply dynamic control among other tools to deal with dynamic investment incentive constraints, and derives the associated virtual valuations, adds the toolkit of mechanism design. (3) New theoretical results. This project explores the boundary of the revenue equivalence theorem, and provides new conditions for uniform ranking of various payment methods when investment incentive arises..In sum, this study on the interaction of the dynamic investment incentives and selection of payment methods would provide theoretical basis and policy suggestions for the allocation of state-owned assets, technology transfer, land auction and various digital resources transaction.
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DOI:
--
发表时间:
2021
期刊:
Economics Letters
影响因子:
作者:
[Lijun Pan, Dazhong Wang]
通讯作者:
Dazhong Wang
DOI:
10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102864
发表时间:
2023
期刊:
Journal of Mathematical Economics
影响因子:
作者:
[Dazhong Wang, Xinyi Xu, Xianjie Zeng]
通讯作者:
Xianjie Zeng
DOI:
--
发表时间:
2021
期刊:
管理科学学报
影响因子:
--
作者:
[曹一秋, 王大中, 曾燕, 张小涛]
通讯作者:
张小涛
DOI:
--
发表时间:
2022
期刊:
Economics Letters
影响因子:
作者:
[Dazhong Wang, Xinyi Xu, Xianjie Zeng]
通讯作者:
Xianjie Zeng
DOI:
--
发表时间:
2022
期刊:
《经济学(季刊)》
影响因子:
作者:
[荣健欣, 王大中]
通讯作者:
王大中
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