近年来，政府和社会资本合作模式（简称PPP）在中国的发展如火如荼。但是，社会资本的选拔在现实中往往存在不公正的现象，国有企业参与的PPP项目要明显多于民营企业。企业参与政府主导的PPP项目是基于盈利动机还是另有所图，国有企业和民营企业的动机是否相同，作为股东代理人的企业高管是否存在偏离企业目标的寻租行为等问题均值得深入研究。基于此，本项目选择上市公司作为研究对象，以寻租理论和委托代理理论为基础，运用双重差分、倾向得分匹配、事件研究等实证方法：首先，识别并检验上市公司高管自利动机下的PPP寻租行为，尤其是国企高管政治晋升动机；其次，考察寻租背景下参与PPP项目上市公司的业绩表现及股价反应；最后，分析该类公司是否存在粉饰业绩的盈余操纵行为及其具体手段。本项目有助于认识PPP模式应用的未预期效应，拓展政治经济学与会计及财务领域的交叉研究，对PPP相关政策制定和上市公司监管具有重要的现实意义。

Public-private partnership (PPP) is widely used in China during the past several years. However, there usually exists unfairness in the process of the selection of business enterprises, and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) obviously gain more PPP projects than non-state-owned enterprises (Non-SOEs). Are business enterprises participating in PPP projects led by the government for profits or other attempts? Do SOEs and Non-SOEs have the same motivation? Are there CEO rent-seeking behaviors deviating from the objectives of the shareholders? All these questions worth in-depth study. Choosing Chinese listed companies as the research object, based on the rent-seeking theory and principal-agent theory, using dynamic difference-in-differences approach with propensity score matching and event study method, this project: (1) investigates the rent-seeking behaviors of PPP-participating listed companies under the motivations of self-interested executives, especially CEO political promotion incentives of SOEs; (2) analyzes the impact of PPP participation on the performance/value of listed companies; (3) examines the potential earnings manipulation behaviors of PPP-participating listed companies based on rent-seeking assumptions. This project contributes to existing research by emphasizing the unintended consequences of PPP application and facilitating the interdisciplinary research between political economics, accounting and finance. The results of this research also have implications for PPP policy setting and the regulation of listed companies.