股东大会对公司重大经营决策进行审批，是我国A股市场公司治理的一个重要特点，也是监管部门重点推进的工作之一。然而，股东大会能否发挥治理效果，还是仅仅是“橡皮图章”。学术界对此存在较大争议，实务界也存在较大疑虑。课题以收购审批为切入点，检验我国A股市场股东大会的治理效果。首先，课题检验股东大会审批对收购质量的影响。然后，沿着“股东投票——市场反应——公司行为”这一路径，从股东投票的决定因素和股东异议表决的经济后果出发，探讨股东大会治理的作用机制和路径。最后，通过《公司法》修订这一特殊的制度背景，检验提升股东大会权限的对公司投资决策的影响。研究方法上，本项目拟采用断点回归（RDD）、双重差分（DID）等方法缓解公司治理研究中的内生性偏差。课题的研究有助于深入了解股东大会的治理功能，拓展现有的公司治理理论。对提升我国资本市场的治理水平和收购质量也具有较强的现实意义。

Approval of major issues through shareholder meetings is one of the important features of corporate governance in the Chinese A-share market. However, whether shareholder meetings exert its governance effect or act as “rubber stamps” is still in great dispute. Furthermore, the practice also cast doubt on of governance role of shareholder meetings. The project, starting with firm acquisition issue, examines the governance effect of shareholder meetings in the Chinese A-share market. Firstly, the project tested the effect of shareholder approval on the quality of firm acquisition. Then, along with the path of “Shareholder voting – Market reaction – Firm behavior”, the project investigated the determinants of shareholder voting and economic consequence of shareholders’ dissenting votes, though which reveals the underlying mechanism of governance effect through shareholder meeting. Finally, taking advantage of the “The Company law” revision as the natural experiment opportunity, the project tested how the lifting the shareholder power affects firms’ investment decisions. To alleviate the endogeneity issue, the project combines various research designs including “Research discontinuity design (RDD)”, “Difference in Difference (DID)”. The project helps understand the governance role of shareholder meeting, extending existing corporate governance theory. It is also of great practical implication in improving the level corporate governance and the quality of firm acquisition.