认证加密算法的新型故障分析研究

认证加密算法作为实现数据保密性和认证性的核心密码体制，它的设计和实现不仅要求具有抵御数学攻击的能力，而且还应具有抵御故障分析的能力。本项目针对典型认证加密算法和结构，重点研究不可能中间相遇故障攻击、双重不可能故障攻击和广义积分故障攻击等新型组合类方法及优化技术，给出攻击代价的定量描述。通过对认证加密算法进行仿真实现，利用故障导入工具产生所需要的故障，验证分析方法的正确性和有效性。在此基础上，提出故障分析认证加密算法的形式化描述，建立相关理论模型。本项目的研究结果将刷新认证加密算法实现强度的安全边界，揭示主流故障分析方法之间的本质联系，为抵御故障攻击的高端智能卡密码芯片的自主设计、分析和测试提供理论依据和技术实现，同时对于增强密码器件与密码系统的防御与破译能力，具有非常重要的现实意义和价值。

Authenticated encryption is a fundamental scheme to achieve data confidentiality and authentication. Its design and implementation should have the ability to resist against both mathematical cryptanalysis and fault analysis. As for the authenticated encryption and its structure, this study proposes the novel combined methods and optimized implementation of fault analysis, such as impossible meet-in-the-middle fault analysis, double impossible fault analysis, and generalized integral fault analysis, etc. It makes uses of the simulation and fault injection tools to validate the correctness and efficiency of fault analysis. On the basis of the above methods and implementation, it establishes the formal description and theoretical model. This study refreshes security boundary in implementation of authentication encryption, and constructs the essential connection of main fault analysis. It provides the theoretical basis and technical realization for the independent design, analysis and testing of cryptographic chips in high-end smart cards. It is also of great significance to enhance the capabilities of protection and decryption for cryptographic devices and systems.