鉴于双重身份属性的地方政府在我国经济社会发展和宏观经济波动中的重要作用，就本项目从多级政府框架下集体行为视角切入，拟系统阐明并实证检验中国分权式改革、中央与地方宏观经济职能分工与宏观经济波动之间的生成机制，为设计并建立治理中国特色经济周期的长效矫正机制服务。首先，基于我国宏观经济波动的典型特征事实，探究政治集权、经济和财政分权改革战略安排下，财政体制和行政管理体制所内含的中国特色振荡型经济周期不同阶段，中央和地方政府合作和博弈所对应的中央和地方政府行为选择，进而生成宏观经济稳定冲击的理论机制；其次，主要从源于政府间经济领域不恰当分权，所对应的生产性政府支出乘数效应以及地方政府资源创造能力对于我国宏观经济波动的影响渠道角度，分三个子课题在我国省级政府层面进行实证检验。完善宏观经济领域中央和地方政府间利益冲突与协调的激励结构和行为机制设计，有助于从根本上解决内生于中国分权改革的宏观经济波动。

Local governments have dual identity attributes and played very important roles in economic and social development and macroeconomic stability in China. In order to provide support for designing and establishing long term rectification mechanism of namaging Chinese economic cycle, this study try to clarify and empirically test the generative mechanism of how Chinese decentralization reform, economic function division between central and local governments lead to macroeconomic unstability. Firstly, based on macroeconomic stylized facts in China, exploring the theoretical mechanism that under political centralization but economic decentralization institutional framework, action selections of central and local governments during their collaboration and game course are asymmetry in different stage of Chinese economic cycle which are endogenous in fiscal and administrative control system, and such will lead to macroeconomic unstability. Secondly, empirically testing impact channels in provincial government level such as fiscal multiplier of government expenditures and resource creation abilities which are primarily attributed to non standard decentralization between central and local governments.Optimizing incentive structure and behavior mechanism design for Conflict and coordination of interest between central and local governments in macroeconomic areas, will contribute to stabilize macroeconomy.