本项目针对近年国内商业银行相继公开上市这一重要现象，借鉴国内外研究成果，结合中国的制度背景，探究公开上市导致的银行激励变化对贷款契约的影响，并联系企业特征和银行特征，从多个视角检视贷款契约变化所体现的信贷资源配置效率。本项目将收集和整理上市公司1999-2011 年各笔银行贷款数据，通过理论分析和实证检验，试图回答以下三个问题：（1）银行上市是否改变以及如何改变了贷款契约？（2）这种贷款契约变化是否以及如何体现了信贷资源配置效率的改善？（3）哪些力量阻碍了公开上市之于信贷资源配置的改善效果？本项目从供应方这一新的视角丰富了学术界在银行激励和贷款契约领域的研究，为理解转型国家中的信贷资源配置效率提供了贷款契约层面的分析框架和科学证据，为修正和发展关于银行改革的现有理论提供了契机。最后，不同于以往集中于银行绩效方面的文献，本项目基于银行贷款行为视角，拓展了银行股票发行私有化经济后果领域的研究。

Considering the important practice that a number of domestic commercial banks have gone public in recently years, this project plans to investigate the effect of bank incentive created by going public on bank loan contract, and to analyze the efficiency of credit allocation reflected by the change in bank loan contract combined with the characteristic of debtors and creditors.Based on prior literature and Chinese institution background, using the bank loan level data from Chinese listed firms during the period 1999-2011, we want to provide the answers for three questions as follows: 1) Does the going public of banks change the terms of bank loan? How is it achieved? 2) How do the changes in bank loan contract reflect the improvement of efficiency of credit allocation? 3) Which forces hinder the effect of going public on the improvement of efficiency of credit allocation? The project can provide a new perspective from supply side to examine the relation between bank incentive and bank loan contract, and develop a loan-level based analytical framework which can be used to test the efficiency of credit allocation, and will provide empirical evidence from China. In addition, for economic consequences of bank ownership and bank privatization, prior literature mainly focus on the bank performance, we extend the prior studies through exploring the effect of going public on bank lending.