本项目研究在不完全信息框架下，最后要价仲裁对于讨价还价的影响。我们将会基于Yildiz(2011)以及Rong(2012)的模型，考虑一个融了讨价还价以及仲裁的模型，在该模型中，两个参与者轮流向对方提出报价，如果某个报价被接受，则该报价就是最终结果，否则，博弈进入到仲裁阶段，在仲裁阶段，仲裁者运用最后要价仲裁的方式来决定最后结果，也即，仲裁者选择最靠近其理想报价水平的参与者报价作为仲裁结果。我们假设仲裁者理想的报价水平是仲裁者的私人信息，我们将探讨这种私人信息所带来的不确定性对于参与者在仲裁前的讨价还价行为的影响，特别的，我们会研究这种不确定性是否会更多的促进参与者在仲裁前达成协议。我们的研究将从理论和实验两部分展开。

This paper studies an alternating-offer arbitration model in which two players maker offers sequentially and an arbitrator determines the outcome whenever both players' offers are rejected by the opponents. I assume that the arbitrator's ideal settlement is his private information. We will study the impact of the introduction of final-offer arbitration on the equilibrium bargaining behavior of the two players before the arbitration. In particular, we will study whether players tend to reach more agreement under the final-offer arbitration than under the conventional arbitration. Our study will have a theoretical part as well as an experimental part.