不完全信息视角下中美贸易战的动态博弈理论与最优因应策略研究

在中美贸易争端呈现动态性，阶段性的背景下，建立一个契合中美贸易争端关键特征事实的动态博弈理论并将之运用于定量的政策分析，具备重要的学术理论意义与显著的政策参考价值。鉴于现有文献关于国家间动态贸易博弈研究的空白，以及对不完全信息所扮演重要角色讨论的缺失，使得现有研究无法深入的探讨贸易争端中各国政策选择的内生性、策略性与动态性。构建一个包括不完全信息的中美贸易争端的动态博弈模型，将弥补这一学术空白，并将提高我国在中美贸易争端中实施国家政策的可靠性与准确性。. . 因此，本课题以中美贸易争端为主要研究对象，使用连续时间下的不完全信息随机重复博弈模型，主要的研究目标包括：（1）通过动态博弈模型，内生的描述中美之间贸易争端的博弈行为；（2）使用参数化模型模拟中美贸易争端博弈的动态性与阶段性；（3）使用理论研究的成果合理的对中美贸易战进行定量预测并提供相关政策的指导。

As China-U.S. Trade War evolved dynamically and lasted across different stages, constructing a dynamic game theory to match crucial stylized facts of China-U.S. Trade way and applying it into quantitative policy analysis, have important theoretical value and could provide meaningful policy suggestions. Suffering from lack of dynamic game theory on international tariff game and missing of discussion on incomplete information, current studies could not deeply explore endogenous, strategic and dynamical policies countries implement during trade war. A dynamic-game model with incomplete information on China-U.S. Trade War could fix such problem and increase the accuracy and reliability of state’s policy during trade war...Thus, this research is aimed to study China-U.S. Trade War, and applies repeated dynamic game theory with incomplete information in continuous time. The major researching goals include: first, to describe the strategic behavior in China-U.S. Trade War endogenously by a dynamic game model; second, to simulate the dynamic pattern of China-U.S. Trade War using a parameterized model; third, to provide quantitative policy suggestion based on theoretical model’s results.