中国上市公司并购合同研究

并购是影响企业价值的重大投资行为，由于并购双方的信息不对称，并购能否成功具有巨大的风险。并购合约的设计是否能有效规避并购风险是上市公司、投资者和监管部门都非常关心的问题。中国上市公司的并购合同中，风险分配条款具有重大的差异，如何解释这些合同条款的差异和对收购结果的影响是本课题集中讨论的问题。我们首先讨论了并购合同中风险分配条款的影响因素，分析了会计信息在并购合同设计中的角色和作用。接着分析了风险分配条款信息公布的短期财务效应和对公司并购长期业绩的影响。最后我们研究了并购监管规则的变化对并购合同设计和并购效果的影响。从实践的角度看，本课题的研究可以帮助上市公司在收购中设计有效控制风险的收购合同，可以帮助投资者评估并购合同对并购风险的控制作用，也有助于监管部门制定更有效的并购监管规则。从学术的角度看，本研究丰富了合同理论的相关文献，拓展了会计信息和合同设计关系的相关文献。

Through acquirers, investors and regulators are all concerned the effectiveness of M&A contracts to control M&A risk, M&A contracts are understudied in academic field relative to their great importance in practice. The risk allocation provisions in M&A contracts exhibit substantial variation across firms, industries and over time in China. Using the M&A cases of listed companies in China, this project will study the determinants of variation and its economic consequences. Specifically, we will discuss four import questions related to M&A contracts. Firstly, we study how M&A contracts are shaped by China institutions and by fundamental economics of corporations. Several explanations such as information asymmetry theory, agency cost theory and transaction cost theory will be distinguished carefully. Secondly, we investigate the role of accounting information to mitigate the information asymmetry and its function to improve M&A contracts. Thirdly, we explore whether and how the risk allocation provisions affect the firms’ performance and the shareholders’ wealth. Finally, we test how M&A regulations affect the design and consequences of M&A contracts. The change of regulation also provides a unique setting to resolve the endogeneity problems in literatures. Our study will help the acquirers to design efficient M&A contracts and help investors to evaluate the risk control by M&A contracts. We also provide evidence of M&A regulations. Our research make great contributions to the development of contract theory.