伴随着我国经济的高速增长，国有企业出现投资过度和投资不足两种非效率投资现象，不仅影响企业价值创造和可持续增长，而且影响宏观经济的持续健康发展。因此，如何治理国有企业的非效率投资已成为中国经济发展亟待解决的现实问题。而良好的内部控制和有效的EVA考核被寄予厚望。本项目拟以代理理论和信息不对称理论为依据，结合中国的制度背景，在梳理国有企业非效率投资的主要动因及其治理路径的基础上，从强化对管理层行为的约束与激励角度，揭示内部控制、EVA考核和国有企业非效率投资治理之间的内在逻辑，深入考察二者发挥作用的不同机理及两者之间的协同互补性，并采用基于面板数据的离散选择模型实证检验二者对非效率投资的治理效应及其协同效应，从而构建内部控制和EVA考核对国有企业非效率投资的协同治理机制。最后，在总结研究结论和经验证据的基础上对我国企业内控规范和EVA考核办法的完善、落实与协调提出有针对性的政策建议

With the rapid growth of Chinese economy, two inefficient investment phenomena, over-investment and under-investment, emerged in State-Owned Enterprises(SOEs), which not only influenced the value creation and sustainable growth of SOEs, but also threatened the steady and sound development of macroeconomy. Thus, the governance of investment inefficiency of SOEs has been a burning realistic problem in China's economic development. To tackle investment inefficiency, sound internal control and effective EVA appraisal have been considered really significant. On the background of Chinese regime, this project first summarizes the main causes and governing measures of investment inefficiency of SOEs. Based on agency theory and asymmetric information, we illustrate the internal logic among internal control, EVA appraisal and investment inefficiency governance from a view of strengthening restraints and motivation to managerial bahavior. Then we investigate the different mechanisms and systematic effect of internal control and EVA, and empirically test their respective governing effects and systematic effect to investment inefficiency via discrete choice models based on panel data, so that we build the systematic governing mechanisms of internal control and EVA to investment inefficiency. Finally, by summarizing the research conclusions and empirical evidence, we offer a targeted policy proposal which assures the improvement, fulfillment and coordination of internal control standards and EVA appraisal methods.