我国医院处于医患保三方关系中的核心地位，如果医疗机构缺乏适当的控制，医生诱导需求将导致医疗费用不合理增长，从而抵消城乡医保的实际效果。本研究以新农合及城居保为研究对象，将医疗保险、医疗供给方行为和医疗费用不合理增长纳入统一分析框架，从供给方角度揭示医保对医疗费用增长的影响机制，并对居民医疗费用增长进行量化分解。本项目主要研究以下三个问题：（1）全民医保背景下我国医疗费用增长是释放居民潜在的医疗需求，还是不合理的过度医疗消费，二者各占的比重是多少？（2）城乡医保降低了医生诱导需求动机吗？（3）城乡医保与医疗市场结构对医生议价能力有何影响？本项目拓展了对城乡医保效果评价的研究视角，对如何加强医疗供给方控制提供了新思路。研究结果为完善我国城乡医保政策及公立医院改革，加快建立医疗机构的外部制衡机制具有实际应用价值。

Hospital is pivotal position in the relationship among doctor-patient and medical insurance in China. If hospital is not to be contained, Physician-induced demand would lead to unreasonable growth of medical expenditure and possibly to weakening positive effect of universal health insurance. New Rural Cooperation Medical System (NRCMS) and Urban Resident Basic Medical Insurance (URBMI) will be taken as subject of study in this research. We will make out relationship of medical insurance, physician behavior and unreasonable growth of medical expenditure to demonstrate influence mechanism of medical insurance on growth of medical expenditure at view of physician. In addition, we will measure growth decomposition of medical expenditure. And three questions are to be answered: (1). Is growth of medical expenditure potential medical demand of residents or unreasonable medical consumption? what percentage are these two sides respectively? (2). Will motivation of physician-induced demand be decreased under condition of universal health insurance? (3). what influence will health insurance and medical market structure have on physician bargaining power? This project bring a new prospective to evaluate the effect of universal health insurance and new way of thinking about how to contain physician behaviour. We are looking forward to provide with policy implication for medical insurance system, state-owned hospital reform and to build up balance mechanism of external power on hospital.