基于社会偏好和有限理性的团队协作激励理论及实验研究

随着生产的发展，团队协作日益普遍。因此，企业组织的一个核心问题便是如何选取合适的激励机制，促使团队成员尽更大努力，从而提升团队协作绩效。本课题依据行为经济学中的愧疚厌恶、条件合作等社会偏好以及路径依赖等有限理性理论，在修正传统博弈论和劳动理论预测的基础上，采用行为理论、实验室实验和实地实验的方法，从静态和动态两个方面研究团队协作中的激励问题。一是在静态场景下外部压力（团队绩效阈值或团队间竞争）与团队内部分配方式（个人计件工资、平均分配、内部锦标赛）对员工努力和团队产出的交互作用。二是团队协作中的动态激励问题，着重探究团队阈值、信息反馈及路径依赖对后续努力和产出的影响。这些研究将深化团队协作激励的机理分析，推进团队协作激励的理论和实验前沿研究，具有潜在的重要学术意义，同时也为中国经济进入新常态后优化企业组织的激励制度、提高微观经济效率提供决策支持。

Teamwork has been increasingly popular with the development of production. Thus, one central issue in firms and organizations is how to decide the appropriate incentive scheme, which can induce a high level of effort from workers and improve team productivity. By introducing social preferences such as guilt aversion and conditional cooperation as well as bounded rationality such as path dependence to revise the predictions from the traditional game theory and labor theory, this project adopts mixed methods of behavioral theory, laboratory experiments and field experiments to study team incentives from both static and dynamic aspects. For the static scenario, we investigate how external pressures such as group threshold (or between-group competitions) interact with typical within-group distribution methods (equal sharing, piece rate, and within-group tournament) in deciding worker efforts and team productivity. For the dynamic scenario, we focus on how group threshold, information feedback, and path dependence together impact later efforts and outputs. All the proposed studies will deepen mechanism analyses of teamwork incentives, advance the theoretical and experimental literature on teamwork incentives, and have potential important academic contributions. Our project can also provide decision supports for firms and organizations to improve incentive schemes and organizational productivity under the current development stage of New Normal in China.