独立董事“纵向联结”研究：成因、治理机制与经济后果

随着资本市场的深度发展，独立董事网络关联正成为上市公司治理架构中的重要演化特征，也是公司治理研究领域的热点议题。大量文献专注于探究由独立董事交叉任职所形成的横向连锁网络以及公司高管与独立董事的内部关联在公司治理和决策层面的影响，却忽视了企业内部独立董事时间序列维度传承特征的决定因素与经济后果。本项目利用中国独立董事间存在大量隐性推荐行为的特征事实，构建独立董事“纵向联结”成因及其影响公司治理和财务决策的分析框架。在理论分析的基础上，实证研究独立董事“纵向联结”形成的影响因素，监督职能与咨询职能的交互变化如何影响公司治理效率，前后任独立董事社会资本阶差的调节作用，以及中组部“18号文”任职限制对于联结治理效应与财务绩效的外生冲击。通过对独立董事“纵向联结”的治理效率作出整体评价与判断，本项目将在董事社会网络关联研究领域贡献新知，并为制定、改进契合中国资本市场实践的独立董事制度提供思路。

With the in-depth development of the capital market, the social network of independent directors is becoming an important element of the governance structure of listed firms and a hot topic in the field of corporate governance research. Many literatures focus on exploring the influence of horizontal network connectedness formed by the cross-serving of independent directors and the internal connectedness between corporate executives and independent directors on the corporate governance and decision-making. However, most of them ignore the determinants and economic consequences of connectedness between independent directors of enterprises based on the time-series dimension. This project takes advantage of the characteristic fact that there are a large number of implicit recommendation behaviors among Chinese independent directors. Thus, we construct an analytical framework for the determinants of independent directors’ vertical connectedness and its influence on corporate governance and financial decision-making. Based on theoretical analysis and empirical research, we explore 1) the the determinant factors of independent directors’ vertical connectedness formation and the impact on corporate governance decisions, 2) how the interaction of the supervision function and consulting functions affect economic consequences of corporate governance behavior, 3) the moderate effect of social capital difference in the vertical connectedness, and 4) the exogenous shock of the Rule No.18 on the formation of vertical connectedness and its effect on corporate financial decisions. This project will make contribution to literatures by focusing on connectedness between independent directors based on the time-series dimension. Through the overall evaluation of the governance efficiency of vertical connectedness, it provides ideas for formulating and improving the reform of the independent director system in line with the practice of China capital market.