从基金经理解雇决策看基金家族的经济角色——基于双层委托代理模型的实证研究

共同基金作为资本市场上最主要的机构投资者和普惠金融的重要载体，其行为特征及运营机制一直是学术界、实务界和监管当局关注的焦点。本项目以基金经理变更为切入点，将基金经理的留任与解雇作为基金家族层面的战略决策进行研究，在双层委托代理模型的框架下探究基金家族如何通过其信息优势，以有效的解雇决策影响投资者和基金经理之间的信息不对称问题，从而提高资产管理行业效率。在学术价值上，本项目旨在填补目前中外文献中相对缺乏的关于基金家族对其旗下基金产品的影响的实证分析，进一步推进学界乃至业界对于基金家族的经济角色的理解。在实践意义上，本项目对深入理解基金业经营策略及经济后果，促使基金公司建立良好的内部治理结构，保护基金投资者利益以及促进基金行业安全稳定发展具有关键意义。这对于仍处在发展初期的中国基金业具有重要的启示作用。

As the most important institutional investor and an important vehicle to promote financial inclusion, mutual funds have always been the focus of contention for academics, regulators, and practitioners in the capital market. This study examines retention and dismissal decisions of mutual fund managers under the framework of a two-layer principal-agent model developed by Gervais et al. (2005). The innovation is to treat mutual fund families as the delegated monitors of fund managers and study how fund families can use their information advantage and effective dismissal decisions to mitigate information asymmetry between investors and fund managers, thereby improving the efficiency of the asset management industry. The study can potentially generate both academic contribution and practical value. In terms of the academic contribution, this project aims to fill in the gap in the literature on the influence of mutual fund families on their products’ performance, hence further improve our understanding of the economic role of fund families. In a practical sense, the study is of key significance for deeper understanding of the fund industry’s business strategies and corresponding economic consequences, urging fund companies to establish a good internal governance structure, protecting the interests of fund investors, and promoting safe and stable development of the fund industry. Given its early stage of development, this study has particularly important implications for Chinese mutual fund industry.