基于禀赋交换的动态匹配机制设计理论与应用研究

匹配市场是在医疗、居住、教育、劳动等领域广泛存在的非价格市场，其交易效率极大地影响参与人的福利。本项目研究基于禀赋交换的动态匹配机制设计理论和应用，目标是使得匹配市场最大程度的克服因为缺乏货币和价格而导致的低效，实现稳健、公正、高效的资源配置。.本项目的机制设计将在满足关键约束下的条件下最大化匹配效率。我们综合两个设定以最大程度提高效率：一是鼓励交易的非同时性，从而充分利用流量来带动存量交易；二是鼓励利他参与人进入市场，从而扩大市场主体增加匹配机会。为保证这两个设定的顺利实施，机制需满足两个关键的激励约束，一是使得交易非同时性得以顺利进行的禀赋分离约束，二是避免参与人伪装成利他类型的完全策略防范约束。我们将首先设计满足完全策略防范的单期匹配机制，再将它拓展为动态机制，考察其动态效率，最后通过优先匹配权的设计使得禀赋分离约束得到满足。我们的研究成果将为建立和完善各类匹配市场提供指导。

The matching market is a non-price market that widely exists in medical, housing, education, labor and other fields, and its transaction efficiency greatly affects the welfare of participants. This project studies the theory and application of dynamic matching mechanism design in matching markets. The goal is to make the market overcome the inefficiency caused by the lack of currency and price and achieve stable, fair and efficient resource allocations.. The mechanism design of this project will maximize matching efficiency while meeting key constraints. We combine the following two features to maximize efficiency: one is to encourage non-simultaneity of transactions, so as to make full use of flow to drive stock transactions; the other is to encourage altruistic participants to enter the market, thereby expanding market entities and increasing matching opportunities. In order to ensure the smooth implementation of these two features, the mechanism must meet two key incentive constraints, one is the endowment separation constraint that allows non-simultaneity of transactions to proceed smoothly, and the other is a constraint of full strategy-proofness that prevents participants from pretending to be altruistic. . We will first design a single-period matching mechanism that satisfies the full strategy-proofness, and then expand it to a dynamic mechanism to examine its dynamic efficiency, and finally meet the endowment separation constraint through the design of priority matching rights. Our research results will provide guidance for the establishment and improvement of various matching markets.