客户集中度与高管主观业绩评价：影响机理及经济后果

伴随着国际贸易争端升级、新冠疫情迅速蔓延，全球需求遭受严重冲击，客户集中所给企业带来风险隐患的概率大大增加。企业如何在薪酬契约中引入自由裁量空间，运用主观业绩评价以激励高管灵活应对客户风险、适应动荡环境，成为当前理论界和实业界亟待解决的问题。本项目立足于当今世界形势与中国情境，系统分析客户集中度与高管主观业绩评价之间关系：首先，结合我国企业间关系型交易特征和高管业绩评价实践，分析客户集中度对于高管主观业绩评价的影响；其次，分别基于企业内部和外部利益相关者博弈视角，探讨客户集中度影响高管主观业绩评价的具体作用机理；最后，着眼于风险承担，研究客户集中度影响高管主观业绩评价的经济后果，并根据组织心理学理论探讨其适用范围。本项目不仅能够从理论上厘清客户集中度对高管主观业绩评价的影响机理和经济后果，也可为我国企业在不确定环境下合理设计高管薪酬契约、运用主观业绩评价应对客户风险提供理论依据和经验证据。

With the escalation of international trade conflicts and the rapid spread of COVID-19, global demand has been shocked, and the probability of potential risks brought by customer concentration has greatly increased. How to introduce discretionary space into the compensation contract and use subjective performance evaluation to motivate executives to flexibly deal with customer risks and adapt to the turbulent environment has become an urgent problem to be solved in the theoretical and industrial circles. Based on the current situation in China and all around the world, this project systematically analyzes the relationship between customer concentration and executive subjective performance evaluation. Firstly, considering the characteristics of relational transactions between Chinese enterprises and executive performance evaluation practices, the impact of customer concentration on executive subjective performance evaluation is analyzed. Secondly, from the perspective of internal and external stakeholders' game, the specific influence mechanisms of customer concentration on executive subjective performance evaluation are discussed. Finally, focusing on risk taking, the economic consequences of customer concentration on executive subjective performance evaluation are studied. And the applicable scope is discussed according to organizational psychology theory. This project not only theoretically clarifies the influence mechanism and economic consequences of customer concentration on executive subjective performance evaluation, but also provides theoretical basis and empirical evidence for Chinese enterprises to reasonably design executive compensation contracts in an uncertain environment and use subjective performance evaluation to deal with customer risks.