Kant's universal law formula revisited
Kant's universal law formula revisited
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重新审视康德的普遍法则公式
DOI：
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发表时间：
2015
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Sven Nyholm
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Sven Nyholm
康德主义者越来越抛弃普遍法则公式，转而支持人类公式。他们认为，前者容易受到各种决定性的反对意见；而后者则容易受到各种不同的反对意见。两者不等价；只有通过诉诸人性公式，康德才能可靠地从他的可接受的理论中产生实质性的含义。这些对普遍法则公式的评估与康德自己对其的评估完全冲突，是基于各种广泛接受的解释假设。本文认为，这些假设取决于关键术语的误导性翻译；有选择地关注康德的具体例子；没有认真对待康德关于其各种思想之间关系的理论主张；以及未能考虑到康德对关键概念的特殊定义。本文试图纠正这些解释错误，并发现普遍法公式并未接受许多标准反对意见。
Kantians are increasingly deserting the universal law formula in favor of the humanity formula. The former, they argue, is open to various decisive objections; the two are not equivalent; and it is only by appealing to the human- ity formula that Kant can reliably generate substantive implications from his theory of an acceptable sort. These assessments of the universal law formula, which clash starkly with Kant’s own assessment of it, are based on various widely accepted interpretative assumptions. These assumptions, it is argued in this article, depend on misleading translations of key terms; selective attention to Kant’s concrete examples; not taking seriously Kant’s theoretical claims about the relations among his various ideas; and a failure to take into account Kant’s idiosyncratic definitions of key concepts. The article seeks to right these inter- pretative wrongs, and finds that the universal law formula is not open to many of the standard objections