Strategic Environmental Policies When Waste Products are Tradable
Strategic Environmental Policies When Waste Products are Tradable
复制标题
废物可交易时的战略环境政策
DOI：
10.1111/1467-9396.00398
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发表时间：
2003
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
T. Kuhn
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Cassing;T. Kuhn
本文讨论了危险废物的国际贸易，其中存在国际废物寡头垄断市场，废物进口国和废物出口国都采取战略行动，利用国家环境政策附加废物贸易产生的租金。作者模拟了一个多阶段博弈，其中工业化国家产生的废物作为生产的副产品，如果不在当地减少，可能会出口到一些欠发达国家，或者以环境税为代价向当地居民征收。在废物市场中，假设存在寡头垄断供应。对废物的需求是完全竞争的，废物处理公司受到边际处置成本和外国征收的环境税的指导。在每个国家都扮演纳什的情况下，分析发现国内和外国税收都与庇古税不同，国内（废物出口商）税率设定在庇古税之下，而外国税率设定在庇古税之上。然而，全球福利最优需要相反方向的税收扭曲，即外国环境税必须低于庇古税率。
The paper deals with international trade in hazardous waste products when there is an international oligopoly market for waste, and both waste-importing and waste-exporting countries act strategically to utilize national environmental policies to attach rents arising from trade in waste. The authors model a multiple-stage game where waste is generated in an industrialized country as a byproduct of production, and potentially is exported to some less-developed countries, if not abated locally, or imposed on local residents at a cost of an environmental tax. In the market for waste, an oligopolistic supply is assumed. The demand for waste is perfectly competitive, with waste-processing firms guided by marginal disposal costs and environmental taxes levied by foreign countries. With each country playing Nash, the analysis finds domestic and foreign taxes to be distorted from the Pigouvian taxes in such a way that the domestic (waste-exporter) tax rate is set below, and the foreign tax rate is set above, the Pigouvian taxes. However, a global welfare optimum requires tax distortions in the opposite direction, in the sense that foreign environmental taxes must be set below the Pigouvian tax rate.