Cost-reducing R&D with spillovers and trade
Cost-reducing R&D with spillovers and trade
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DOI：
10.1628/093245611796589997
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发表时间：
2011-06
期刊：
影响因子：
0.4
通讯作者：
R. Goel;Shoji Haruna
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
R. Goel;Shoji Haruna
本文结合研究溢出效应，考察了企业在两阶段国际贸易博弈过程创新中的行为。政府在第一阶段选择最优研究补贴，企业在第二阶段选择研究和生产时考虑补贴。研究结果表明，在有溢出和无溢出的情况下，最优科研补贴存在差异。对外国研究补贴的战略回应只会发生在具有溢出效应的情况下。在一定的溢出水平下，最优研发政策是负补贴（税）。尽管对贸易自由化的反应因外溢而不同，但有关贸易自由化效应的研究结果支持了先前的结果，具有完全的适宜性。
This article incorporates research spillovers and examines behavior of firms in a two-stage, international trade game with process innovation. Governments choose optimal research subsidies in stage 1, and firms take account of the subsidies in choosing research and production in stage 2. Results show that optimal research subsidies differ under spillovers and no spillovers. Strategic responses to foreign research subsidies uniquely occur in cases with spillovers. At certain spillover levels, the optimal R&D policy is a negative subsidy (tax). Findings regarding the effects of trade liberalization support earlier results with perfect appropriability, although the responses to trade liberalization are different with spillovers.