International public goods and contribution productivity differentials
International public goods and contribution productivity differentials
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国际公共产品和贡献生产率差异
DOI：
10.1016/0047-2727(95)01522-1
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发表时间：
1996
影响因子：
9.8
通讯作者：
Toshihiro Ihori
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Toshihiro Ihori
本文研究了在非合作自愿提供纯粹公共物品的背景下，公共物品贡献的生产率差异对国民福利的影响。生产力高的国家不一定享有高福利。在贡献博弈中补贴对方可能会导致强悖论结果，而一次性转移则会导致弱悖论结果。我们还探讨了多俱乐部模型中公共物品的价格与开放俱乐部规模之间的关系。
This paper investigates the impacts of productivity differentials in contributing to the public good on national welfare in the context of non-cooperative voluntary provision of a pure public good. A country with high productivity does not necessarily enjoy high welfare. Subsidizing the other country in a contribution game may lead to a strong paradoxical result, while a lump-sum transfer will lead to a weak paradoxical result. We also explore the relationship between the price of the public good and the size of an open club in a multi-club model.