No margin, no mission? A field experiment on incentives for public service delivery
No margin, no mission? A field experiment on incentives for public service delivery
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DOI：
10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.06.014
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发表时间：
2014-12-01
影响因子：
9.8
通讯作者：
Jack, B. Kelsey
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Ashraf, Nava;Bandiera, Oriana;Jack, B. Kelsey
我们进行了一项现场实验，以评估外部奖励，包括财务和非财务奖励，对公共卫生组织招募的宣传艾滋病毒预防和销售避孕套的代理人的表现的影响。在这种情况下：(I)非经济奖励在提高绩效方面是有效的；(Ii)对于亲社会动机的人员来说，这两种奖励的效果更强；以及(Iii)当两种奖励的相对价值较高时，这两种奖励都是有效的。研究结果表明，外在奖励可以改善从事公共服务提供的代理人的绩效，而非金钱奖励在经济激励力量有限的情况下可以有效。(C)爱思唯尔出版的2014年。
We conduct a field experiment to evaluate the effect of extrinsic rewards, both financial and non-financial, on the performance of agents recruited by a public health organization to promote HIV prevention and sell condoms. In this setting: (i) non-financial rewards are effective at improving performance; (ii) the effect of both types of rewards is stronger for pro-socially motivated agents; and (iii) both types of rewards are effective when their relative value is high. The findings illustrate that extrinsic rewards can improve the performance of agents engaged in public service delivery, and that non-financial rewards can be effective in settings where the power of financial incentives is limited. (C) 2014 Published by Elsevier B.V.