Active linking in evolutionary games
Active linking in evolutionary games
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DOI：
10.1016/j.jtbi.2006.06.027
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发表时间：
2006-12-07
影响因子：
2
通讯作者：
Nowak, Martin A.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Pacheco, Jorge M.;Traulsen, Arne;Nowak, Martin A.
在进化博弈论的传统方法中，群体中的个体随机相遇，并且他们无法控制相互作用的频率或持续时间。在这里，我们删除了这些简化的假设。我们引入了一种新模型，其中个体寻求新互动的速度有所不同。一旦两个人之间建立了联系，就会评估该联系的生产力。链接可以以不同的速率断开。在极限情况下，链接动力学引入了支付矩阵的简单变换。我们概述了进化稳定性的条件。作为一个具体的例子，我们研究合作者和叛逃者之间的相互作用。我们发现了一种简单的关系，它表征了那些使自然选择有利于合作而不是背叛的联系动态。 (c) 2006 Elsevier Ltd. 保留所有权利。
In the traditional approach to evolutionary game theory, the individuals of a population meet each other at random, and they have no control over the frequency or duration of interactions. Here we remove these simplifying assumptions. We introduce a new model, where individuals differ in the rate at which they seek new interactions. Once a link between two individuals has formed, the productivity of this link is evaluated. Links can be broken off at different rates. In a limiting case, the linking dynamics introduces a simple transformation of the payoff matrix. We outline conditions for evolutionary stability. As a specific example, we study the interaction between cooperators and defectors. We find a simple relationship that characterizes those linking dynamics which allow natural selection to favour cooperation over defection. (c) 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.