When financial markets work too well: A cautious case for a securities transactions tax
When financial markets work too well: A cautious case for a securities transactions tax
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DOI：
10.1007/bf00122806
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发表时间：
1989-12
影响因子：
1.4
通讯作者：
L. Summers;V. Summers
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
L. Summers;V. Summers
与大多数主要工业化国家不同，美国不对证券交易征收消费税。这篇文章探讨了实施美国证券转让消费税(STET)的可取性和可行性，旨在遏制与短期投机相关的过度行为，并增加收入。我们的结论是，可以提出强有力的经济效率论据，以支持詹姆斯·托宾(James Tobin)(1982)所说的将我们过度良好运行的金融市场“沙子扔进齿轮”的STET。这样的税收将产生以下有益效果：遏制投机带来的不稳定，减少资源转向经济中的金融部门，并拉长企业经理的视野。遏制投机所带来的效率效益，可能会超过对金融交易课以更重税所带来的流动性减少或资金成本增加的任何成本。日本和英国的例子表明，STET在行政上是可行的，可以在不削弱美国金融市场竞争力的情况下实施。税率为0.5%的STAT每年可以带来至少100亿美元的收入。
Unlike most major industrialized nations, the United States does not impose an excise tax on securities transactions. This article examines the desirability and feasibility of implementating a U.S. Securities Transfer Excise Tax (STET) directed at curbing excesses associated with short-term speculation and at raising revenue. We conclude that strong economic efficiency arguments can be made in support of a STET that throws “sand into the gears,” in James Tobin's (1982) phrase, of our excessively well-functioning financial markets. Such a tax would have the beneficial effects of curbing instability introduced by speculation, reducing the diversion of resources into the financial sector of the economy, and lengthening the horizons of corporate managers. The efficiency benefits derived from curbing speculation are likely to exceed any costs of reduced liquidity or increased costs of capital that come from taxing financial transactions more heavily. The examples of Japan and the United Kingdom suggest that a STET is administratively feasible and can be implemented without crippling the competitiveness of U.S. financial markets. A STET at a .5% rate could raise revenues of at least $10 billion annually.