Office and Policy Payoffs in Coalition Governments
Office and Policy Payoffs in Coalition Governments
复制标题
联合政府的办公室和政策回报
DOI：
10.1177/1354068807088121
复制
发表时间：
2008
期刊：
影响因子：
2.7
通讯作者：
M. Debus
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
M. Debus
根据联盟形成理论，在联盟博弈中处于关键地位的政党比其联盟伙伴获得更高的职位和政策回报。在这篇文章中，我使用了政府形成的两个模型——投资组合分配模型和政治心脏模型——来确定联盟博弈中的关键参与者。这两个模型都进行了修改，以纳入对联盟形成的制度和政治限制，并将四个模型中关键政党的预测与五个欧洲国家实际组建的政府进行了比较：奥地利（1983-2002）、比利时（1985-2003）、德国（1980 - 2005）、爱尔兰（1982-2002）和荷兰（1977-2003）。我认为，从理论和实证的角度来看，修改后的模型比原来的模型更可取。使用修正模型确定的关键政党，我发现如果一个联盟成员是关键政党，那么它能够比其联盟伙伴更有效地主张其政策观点，但是，与文献中的预期相反，它无法获得内阁职位的超额份额。
According to theories on coalition formation, parties with a key position in the coalition game receive higher office and policy payoffs than their coalition partners. In this article, I use two models of government-formation — the portfolio allocation model and the political heart model — to identify key players in the coalition game. Both models are modified to incorporate institutional and political constraints on coalition-formation, and the predictions of key parties from the four models are compared with the governments that actually formed in five European countries: Austria (1983—2002), Belgium (1985—2003), Germany (1980— 2005), Ireland (1982—2002) and The Netherlands (1977—2003). I argue that the modified models are preferred to the original ones on both theoretical and empirical grounds. Using the key parties identified by the modified models, I find that if a coalition member is a key party, then it is able to assert its policy views more effectively than its coalition partners can, but, contrary to expectations in the literature, that it is unable to capture a surpassing share of cabinet offices.
DOI：
10.5771/9783845203898
发表时间：
2006
期刊：
影响因子：
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作者：
通讯作者：
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