PHENOMENAL SIMULTANEITY AND PERCEPTUAL MOMENT HYPOTHESIS
PHENOMENAL SIMULTANEITY AND PERCEPTUAL MOMENT HYPOTHESIS
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DOI：
10.1111/j.2044-8295.1968.tb01154.x
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发表时间：
1968-01-01
影响因子：
4
通讯作者：
ALLPORT, DA
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
ALLPORT, DA
在一个临界时间间隔内连续的短暂视觉刺激是现象上同时发生的。本文探讨了两种模型的知觉抽样，其目的是占现象的一致性。第一个是斯特劳德（1955）的理论，感觉输入被量化成连续的，离散的总和周期或“时刻”（离散时刻假设）。另一种模型，一般没有被认为是代表的“时刻”作为一个连续的，运行的样本的输入（移动的时刻假设）。两个实验现象的一致性的报告，这两个假设之间提供了一个关键的测试。结果与离散矩模型完全不相容，因此被拒绝。旅行力矩模型很好地解释了结果。这些也表明了现象的连续性的极限和亮度总和的临界持续时间之间可能存在的关系。
Successive brief visual stimuli falling within a critical time interval are phenomenally simultaneous. This paper examines two models of perceptual sampling which purport to account for phenomenal simultaneity. The first is Stroud's (1955) theory that the sensory input is quantized into successive, discrete summation periods or ‘moments’ (the Discrete Moment Hypothesis). An alternative model which has not generally been considered represents the ‘moment’ as a continuous, running sample of the input (the Travelling Moment Hypothesis).Two experiments on phenomenal simultaneity are reported which provide a critical test between these two hypotheses. The results were entirely incompatible with the discrete moment model, which is therefore rejected. The travelling moment model accounted well for the results. These also suggest a possible relation between the limits of phenomenal simultaneity and the critical duration of brightness summation.