Hierarchical hypergames and Bayesian games: A generalization of the theoretical comparison of hypergames and Bayesian games considering hierarchy of perceptions
Hierarchical hypergames and Bayesian games: A generalization of the theoretical comparison of hypergames and Bayesian games considering hierarchy of perceptions
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DOI：
10.1007/s11424-015-3288-9
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发表时间：
2016-02
影响因子：
2.1
通讯作者：
Y. Sasaki;K. Kijima
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Y. Sasaki;K. Kijima
本文讨论了两种独立发展的不完全信息博弈模型--层次超博弈和贝叶斯博弈之间的关系。它可以被认为是之前关于简单超博弈和贝叶斯博弈理论比较的研究（Sasaki和Kijima，2012）的概括，考虑了感知的层次结构，即，首先介绍了将层次超对策转化为相应的贝叶斯对策的一般方法，称之为层次超对策的贝叶斯表示。然后，作者表明，层次超博弈的一些均衡概念可以与贝叶斯博弈的均衡概念相关联，并讨论了结果的影响。
This paper discusses the relationship of two independently developed models of games with incomplete information, hierarchical hypergames and Bayesian games. It can be considered as a generalization of the previous study on the theoretical comparison of simple hypergames and Bayesian games (Sasaki and Kijima, 2012) by taking into account hierarchy of perceptions, i.e., an agent’s perception about the other agents’ perceptions, and so on. The authors first introduce the general way of transformation of any hierarchical hypergames into corresponding Bayesian games, which was called as the Bayesian representation of hierarchical hypergames. The authors then show that some equilibrium concepts for hierarchical hypergames can be associated with those for Bayesian games and discuss implications of the results.