Predatory Pricing and the Acquisition Cost of Competitors
Predatory Pricing and the Acquisition Cost of Competitors
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掠夺性定价和竞争对手的收购成本
DOI：
10.1086/261374
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发表时间：
1986
影响因子：
8.2
通讯作者：
M. R. Burns
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
M. R. Burns
本文考察了掠夺性降价是否降低了信托收购竞争对手的成本。Litzenberger-Rao估值模型的一个变体是根据老美国烟草公司在1891年至1906年期间收购的43家竞争对手公司的支出进行估计的。系数估计表明，在其他条件相同的情况下，被指控的掠夺行为大大降低了烟草信托的收购成本，无论是对声称的受害者，还是对和平售罄的竞争对手来说，都是通过声誉影响。尽管受到数据限制的限制，这些结果支持了掠夺性定价作为一种系统性商业实践的经典观点。
This paper investigates whether predatory price cutting reduces a trust's cost of acquiring its competitors. A variant of the Litzenberger-Rao valuation model is estimated with the expenditures for 43 rival firms purchased by the old American Tobacco Company between 1891 and 1906. The coefficient estimates indicate that, ceteris paribus, alleged predation significantly lowered the acquisition costs of the tobacco trust both for asserted victims and, through reputation effects, for competitors that sold out peacefully. Although qualified by data limitations, these results support the classical view of predatory pricing as a systematic business practice.