Subnational Borrowing in Japan: from 'Implicit Guarantee' to Market Discipline and Fiscal Rule
Subnational Borrowing in Japan: from 'Implicit Guarantee' to Market Discipline and Fiscal Rule
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日本地方借贷：从“隐性担保”到市场纪律和财政规则
DOI：
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发表时间：
2008
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Nobuki Mochida
中科院分区：
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作者：
Nobuki Mochida
在许多国家，地方借贷是道路、桥梁和水利工程等长期发展项目的重要来源。当地为这些项目借款是合理的，因为这些项目的效益往往持续数十年，这些项目的费用应由未来的纳税人承担。然而，人们对分散的地方政府发行地方债券表示严重关切。日本地方政府不会因为这种“隐性政府担保”而拖欠债务。“因此，贷款人和纳税人失去了监督地方政府的动力，因为他们认为自己的投资受到中央政府的保护。本文旨在考察日本的地方借贷。首先，从行政控制过渡到基于规则的，市场导向的制度进行了描述。在此基础上，研究了软预算约束和市场约束的有效性。第三，比较了银行贷款和地方债券作为长期基础设施融资的方式。最后，本文对日本地方债券的信用问题进行了分析，并提出了一些建议。
In many countries, local borrowing is an important source for long-term development projects such as roads, bridges, and waterworks. Local borrowing for such projects is justified on the ground that benefit of these projects often last decades and the cost of these projects should be borne by future tax payers. However, there are serious concerns with issuance of local bonds by decentralized local governments. Local governments in Japan would not default on their borrowing because of such "implicit government guarantee." As a result, lenders and tax payers have lost incentive to monitor subnational government because they view their investment as protected by a central government. The purpose of this paper is to review the local borrowing in Japan. At first, the transition from administrative control to rule-based, market oriented system is described. Following this, soft budget constraint and effectiveness of market discipline is investigated. Third, bank lending and local bonds as a way of financing long-term infrastructures are compared. Finally, we shed light on the credibility of local bonds in Japan and offer some proposals.