Discursive justification and skepticism
Discursive justification and skepticism
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DOI：
10.1007/s11229-012-0076-0
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发表时间：
2012-11-01
期刊：
影响因子：
1.5
通讯作者：
Gerken, Mikkel
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Gerken, Mikkel
在这篇论文中，我考虑了我在早期的工作中提出的一般认知行为规范应该如何被具体化，以管理某些类型的行为：断言言语行为。更具体地说，我认为，认知规范的断言是结构相似的认知规范的行动。首先，我认为，在一个中心类型的断言的认知规范操作的概念，是一个内在的，我称之为“话语的理由。“这种类型的保证是内在的，因为它要求代理人能够阐明她的信念的理由。这个想法，粗略地说，当一个人断言p时，一个人应该能够给出理由相信p. Bonjour可靠的千里眼诺曼，例如，即使诺曼知道总统的下落，也不能对总统的下落做出断言。最后，我简要地考虑是否一种类型的怀疑论的论点，通常标记阿格里帕的三难困境的动机，至少在一定程度上，它的反应违反了相关的认知规范的断言。
In this paper, I consider how a general epistemic norm of action that I have proposed in earlier work should be specified in order to govern certain types of acts: assertive speech acts. More specifically, I argue that the epistemic norm of assertion is structurally similar to the epistemic norm of action. First, I argue that the notion of warrant operative in the epistemic norm of a central type of assertion is an internalist one that I call 'discursive justification.' This type of warrant is internalist insofar as it requires that the agent is capable of articulating reasons for her belief. The idea, roughly, is that when one asserts that p, one is supposed to be in a position to give reasons for believing that p. Bonjour's reliable clairvoyant Norman, for example, is not in an epistemic position to make assertions regarding the president's whereabouts-even if Norman knows the president's whereabouts. In conclusion, I briefly consider whether a type of skeptical argument-often labeled Agrippa's Trilemma-is motivated, at least in part, by the fact that responses to it violate the relevant epistemic norm of assertion.