Saving the Banks
Saving the Banks
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拯救银行
DOI：
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发表时间：
2012
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Cornelia Woll
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文献类型：
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作者：
E. Grossman;Cornelia Woll
在2007-2009年金融危机期间，政府在设计银行救助计划和决定干预高度方面有多大的回旋余地？通过分析欧洲和北美的各种救助，我们将表明，政府用来科普金融市场不稳定的战略并不仅仅取决于经济状况。相反，它们植根于每个国家的体制和政治环境，特别是根据银行能够与公共决策者建立的不同类型的企业-政府关系而有所不同。不过，“裙带资本主义”的说法夸大了银行游说的作用。通过对爱尔兰、丹麦、英国和法国银行救助的四个案例研究，我们发现，政策制定者和银行管理层之间有着密切的一对一关系的国家往往会制定不平衡的救助方案，而银行集体谈判的国家则会制定出私人机构分担更大负担的解决方案。
How much leeway did governments have in designing bank bailouts and deciding on the height of intervention during the 2007-2009 financial crisis? By analyzing the variety of bailouts in Europe and North America, we will show that the strategies governments use to cope with the instability of financial markets does not depend on economic conditions alone. Rather, they take root in the institutional and political setting of each country and vary in particular according to the different types of business–government relations banks were able to entertain with public decision makers. Still, “crony capitalism” accounts overstate the role of bank lobbying. With four case studies of the Irish, Danish, British, and French bank bailout, we show that countries with close one-on-one relationships between policy makers and bank management tended to develop unbalanced bailout packages, while countries where banks negotiated collectively developed solutions with a greater burden-sharing from private institutions.