Peer Pressure and Incentives
Peer Pressure and Incentives
复制标题
同侪压力和激励
DOI：
10.1111/j.0307-3378.2006.00233.x
复制
发表时间：
2006
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Kohei Daido
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Kohei Daido
我们研究了同伴压力对激励的影响。为此，我们扩展了多智能体模型的道德风险和有限责任，通过引入一个同伴压力函数。我们发现，最优激励的生产力较低的代理人是更高的权力比生产力较高的代理人的情况下，与同行的压力。此外，与没有同伴压力的情况相比，生产力较低的代理人的最佳激励变得更高，而生产力较高的代理人的最佳激励变得不那么高。
We study the effects of peer pressure on incentives. To this end, we extend a multiagent model with moral hazard and limited liability by introducing a peer pressure function. We show that the optimal incentive for the less productive agent is more high powered than that for the more productive agent in the case with peer pressure. Moreover, in comparison with the case without peer pressure, the optimal incentive for the less productive agent becomes more high powered, while the optimal incentive for the more productive agent becomes less high powered.