Comparing Bayesian and non-Bayesian accounts of human confidence reports
Comparing Bayesian and non-Bayesian accounts of human confidence reports
复制标题
DOI：
10.1371/journal.pcbi.1006572
复制
发表时间：
2018-11-01
影响因子：
4.3
通讯作者：
Ma, Wei Ji
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Adler, William T.;Ma, Wei Ji
人类可以有意义地报告他们对感知或认知决策的信心。人们普遍认为，这些报告反映了贝叶斯概率的决定是正确的，但这一假设还没有严格测试对非贝叶斯替代品。我们使用两个感知分类任务，贝叶斯置信度报告要求受试者以特定的方式考虑感官的不确定性。我们发现，受试者在报告信心时确实考虑到了感官不确定性，这表明参与报告信心的大脑区域可以访问感官不确定性的低级别表征，这是贝叶斯推理的先决条件。然而，行为与贝叶斯假设并不完全一致，并且可以通过以非贝叶斯方式使用不确定性的简单启发式模型来更好地描述。这两个结论是强大的不确定性操作，任务，响应方式，模型比较指标的变化，并在贝叶斯模型的额外的灵活性。我们的研究结果表明，坚持理性的信心行为可能需要纳入实施的限制。
Humans can meaningfully report their confidence in a perceptual or cognitive decision. It is widely believed that these reports reflect the Bayesian probability that the decision is correct, but this hypothesis has not been rigorously tested against non-Bayesian alternatives. We use two perceptual categorization tasks in which Bayesian confidence reporting requires subjects to take sensory uncertainty into account in a specific way. We find that subjects do take sensory uncertainty into account when reporting confidence, suggesting that brain areas involved in reporting confidence can access low-level representations of sensory uncertainty, a prerequisite of Bayesian inference. However, behavior is not fully consistent with the Bayesian hypothesis and is better described by simple heuristic models that use uncertainty in a non-Bayesian way. Both conclusions are robust to changes in the uncertainty manipulation, task, response modality, model comparison metric, and additional flexibility in the Bayesian model. Our results suggest that adhering to a rational account of confidence behavior may require incorporating implementational constraints.