Strategic Intermediation in a Two-Sided Market
Strategic Intermediation in a Two-Sided Market
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发表时间：
2004
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通讯作者：
Andrea Galeotti-;José Luis Moraga-González-
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作者：
Andrea Galeotti-;José Luis Moraga-González-
我们考察了一个双边市场，在这个市场中，中介机构竞相吸引公司的广告和买家的观众。公司销售同质产品，在价格上竞争，必须在中介平台上做广告以吸引消费者。买家必须向中间商订阅才能获得产品和价格信息。我们发现，垄断中介通过免费投放广告并从消费者那里获得大部分利润来实现利润最大化。通过这种方式，中介充分内化了买家和卖家之间的外部性，从而产生了特定的结果。相反，当信息市场由相互竞争的中介机构运作时，企业和消费者试图从参与中获取剩余会导致协调摩擦的出现，从而产生市场失灵。只有当消费者肯定有多个家，中介进入成本非常低时，才能恢复专业性。
We examine a two-sided market where intermediaries compete to attract advertising from firms and audience from buyers. Firms sell homogeneous products, compete in prices and must advertise them in the intermediary platforms to attract consumers. Buyers must subscribe to the intermediaries to receive product and price information. We show that a monopolist intermediary maximizes profits by oering advertising for free and getting the bulk of its profits from consumers. In this way the intermediary fully internalizes the externalities between buyers and sellers, which produces an ecient outcome. By contrast, when the market for information is operated by competing intermediaries, firms’ and consumers’ attempts to obtain surplus from participation lead to the emergence of coordination frictions, which produce a market failure. Eciency can only be restored if consumers multi-home surely and intermediaries entry costs are suciently low.