Conducting truthful surveys, cheaply
Conducting truthful surveys, cheaply
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以低廉的成本进行真实的调查
DOI：
10.1145/2229012.2229076
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发表时间：
2012
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
G. Schoenebeck
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Aaron Roth;G. Schoenebeck
我们考虑的问题是，当个人参与调查的成本未知(从已知的先验数据中提取)时，进行调查的目的是获得对某些人口统计数据的无偏估计。个人的参与必须得到补偿，并且是战略代理人，因此支付方案必须激励诚实的行为。我们给出了两个目标的最优真实机制：在给定的固定预算下最小化估计量的方差，在给定固定的方差目标的情况下最小化调查的预期成本。
We consider the problem of conducting a survey with the goal of obtaining an unbiased estimator of some population statistic when individuals have unknown costs (drawn from a known prior) for participating in the survey. Individuals must be compensated for their participation and are strategic agents, and so the payment scheme must incentivize truthful behavior. We derive optimal truthful mechanisms for this problem for the two goals of minimizing the variance of the estimator given a fixed budget, and minimizing the expected cost of the survey given a fixed variance goal.