On thought experiments as a priori science
On thought experiments as a priori science
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论思想实验作为先验科学
DOI：
10.1080/02698599908573622
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发表时间：
1999
影响因子：
0.8
通讯作者：
R. Arthur
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
R. Arthur
诺顿声称，所有的思想实验可以减少到明确的论点，我捍卫布朗的立场，某些思想实验产生先验知识。我认为，他们这样做不是通过让我们感知“柏拉图式的普遍性”（布朗），即使它们可能包含非命题成分，这些成分在认识上是不可或缺的，而是通过帮助识别某些隐性预设或“自然解释”。（费耶阿本德的术语），导致矛盾的现象时，描述他们，并提出一种新的自然解释，根据这种解释，可以毫无矛盾地重新描述这种现象。
Abstract Against Norton's claim that all thought experiments can be reduced to explicit arguments, I defend Brown's position that certain thought experiments yield a priori knowledge. They do this, I argue, not by allowing us to perceive “Platonic universals” (Brown), even though they may contain non‐propositional components that are epistemically indispensable, but by helping to identify certain tacit presuppositions or “natural interpretations” (Feyerabend's term) that lead to a contradiction when the phenomenon is described in terms of them, and by suggesting a new natural interpretation in terms of which the phenomenon can be redescribed free of contradiction.