Retaliation against protocol attacks
Retaliation against protocol attacks
复制标题
针对协议攻击的报复
DOI：
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复制
发表时间：
2008
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Stefano Bistarelli
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
G. Bella;Stefano Bistarelli
安全协议打算给他们的当事人合理的保证，某些安全属性将保护他们的通信会话。然而，文献证实，协议可能遭受微妙和隐藏的攻击。有缺陷的协议通常会被送回设计过程，但重新设计已部署协议的成本可能会令人望而却步。这篇论文概述了报复的概念：今天谁会偷一笔钱，这是否会带来明天被偷两倍的巨大风险？当道德被抛在后面时，攻击总是平衡的决定：如果攻击可以被报复，安全经济可能会说服攻击者避免攻击，而我们则接受有缺陷的协议。这种新的观点需要一种新的威胁模型，在这种模型中，任何一方都可能为了自己的利益而决定破坏协议，这取决于报复的风险。该威胁模型也适用于研究不可抵赖协议，似乎比Dolev-Yao模型更适合当前的技术/社会环境。结果表明，机器辅助协议验证能够有效地适应新的威胁模型。
Security protocols intend to give their parties reasonable assurance that certain security properties will protect their commu- nication session. However, the literature confirms that the protocols may suffer subtle and hidden attacks. Flawed protocols are custom- arily sent back to the design process, but the costs of reengineer- ing a deployed protocol may be prohibitive. This paper outlines the concept of retaliation: who would steal a sum of money today, should this pose significant risks of having twice as much stolen back tomorrow? When ethics is left behind, attacks are always bal- anced decisions: if an attack can be retaliated, the economics of security may convince the attacker to refrain from attacking, and us to live with a flawed protocol. This new perspective requires a new threat model where any party may decide to subvert the pro- tocol for his own sake, depending on the risks of retaliation. This threat model, which for example is also suitable to studying non- repudiation protocols, seems more appropriate than the Dolev-Yao model to the present technological/social setting. It is demonstrated that machine-assisted protocol verification can can effectively be adapted to the new threat model.