Second Sourcing vs. Sole Sourcing with Capacity Investment and Asymmetric Information
Second Sourcing vs. Sole Sourcing with Capacity Investment and Asymmetric Information
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DOI：
10.1287/msom.1080.0232
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发表时间：
2009-07
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Cuihong Li;L. Debo
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Cuihong Li;L. Debo
我们研究的决策制造商（买方），期待新的采购机会，在选择之间的独家和第二次采购战略的非商品组件。在单一采购策略中，买方承诺在整个范围内从单一供应商（现任供应商）采购。在第二次采购战略中，买方保留了将来从新供应商（进入者）采购的选择权。供应商的成本是私人信息，而在位者的成本可能会因为它所学到的而在未来发生变化。买方对当前需求相对确定，但对未来需求不确定。供应商必须投资于为买方生产投入的能力。通过未来的私人成本信息，现任者在未来赚取租金，而这种预期租金会影响现任者在早期的决策。一方面，第二来源战略允许买方利用替代来源机会，降低其未来成本。这种对买方的好处被称为第二来源的选择权价值。另一方面，未来供应商在第二来源的竞争损害了在位者的未来利润。对第二来源未来利润较低的预期促使在位者在开始时要求更高的价格。这就导致了二次采购中采购商的初始采购成本高于单一采购，即二次采购的未来供应商竞争成本。二次采购相对于单一采购的总体效益受需求分布和能力成本的影响。如果需求随时间以正概率增加，则在位者的初始容量可能无法覆盖所有未来需求。如果生产能力便宜，进入者可能会成为独家供应商，取代现有的供应商。在这种情况下，二次采购的选择价值很高。如果容量昂贵，进入者可以作为补充供应商，仅接收超过现有装机容量的需求。在这种情况下，未来供应商竞争的成本较低，期权价值仍然显著。因此，第二次采购比单一采购更好，不仅当能力成本低，而且当它是高的（在需求随着时间的推移以正概率增加和进入者的成本相对较低的条件下）。对于中间能力成本，未来供应商竞争的成本主导了期权价值，因此，独家采购是首选。我们还发现，当买方预期未来需求更高或更不稳定时，第二来源更具吸引力。最后，更多的初始在位者能力加强在位者对进入者的竞争力，降低未来供应商竞争的成本。因此，我们发现，第二次采购可能会导致过度投资的初始能力。
We study the decision of a manufacturer (the buyer), expecting new sourcing opportunities in the future, in selecting between sole-and second-sourcing strategies for a noncommodity component. In a sole-sourcing strategy, the buyer commits to sourcing from a single supplier (the incumbent) over the entire horizon. In a second-sourcing strategy, the buyer keeps the option open to source from a new supplier (the entrant) in the future. Supplier costs are private information, and the incumbent's cost may change in the future because of what it has learned. The buyer is relatively sure about current demand but uncertain about future demand. A supplier has to invest in capacity to produce the inputs for the buyer. With future private cost information, the incumbent earns rent in the future, and this prospective rent influences the incumbent's decision early in the horizon. On one hand, a second-sourcing strategy allows the buyer to take advantage of alternative sourcing opportunities, lowering her future cost. This benefit to the buyer is referred to as the option value of second sourcing. On the other hand, the future supplier competition in second-sourcing hurts the incumbent's future profit. The expectation of a lower future profit in second sourcing induces the incumbent to ask for a higher price at the beginning of the horizon. This causes more initial sourcing cost for the buyer in second sourcing than in sole sourcing, and is referred to as the cost of future supplier competition of second sourcing. The overall benefit of second sourcing relative to sole sourcing is influenced by the demand distribution and capacity cost. If the demand increases over time with positive probability, the incumbent's initial capacity may not be able to cover all future demand. If the capacity is cheap, the entrant may serve as an exclusive supplier, ousting the incumbent. In this case, the option value of second sourcing is high. If the capacity is expensive, the entrant may serve as a supplementary supplier by receiving only the demand in excess of the incumbent's installed capacity. In this case, the cost of future supplier competition is low and the option value is still significant. Thus second sourcing is better than sole sourcing not only when the capacity cost is low, but also when it is high (under the condition that demand increases over time with positive probability and the entrant's cost is relatively low). For intermediate capacity cost, the cost of future supplier competition dominates the option value; hence, sole sourcing is preferred. We also find that second sourcing is more attractive when the buyer expects the future demand to be higher or more volatile. Finally, more initial incumbent capacity strengthens the incumbent's competitiveness against the entrant, reducing the cost of future supplier competition. As a result, we find that second sourcing may lead to overinvestment of the initial capacity.