Market share, cost-based dumping, and anti-dumping policy
Market share, cost-based dumping, and anti-dumping policy
复制标题
市场份额、基于成本的倾销和反倾销政策
DOI：
10.1111/0008-4085.00005
复制
发表时间：
2000
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
U. Walz
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Thusnelda Tivig;U. Walz
本文研究了在确定性定价的两阶段双寡头模型中，不同产品的倾销行为和反倾销税的含义。当当前的市场份额对未来需求很重要时，基于成本的倾销可能会有利可图。因此，倾销是一种对市场份额的投资形式。这可能引发反倾销法的适用。我们进一步表明，正确预期的关税并不一定会阻碍企业低于成本销售。然而，仅仅反倾销法的存在就大大改变了博弈的结构，导致两家公司的第一阶段价格更高。
This paper studies the occurrence of dumping and the implications of anti-dumping duties in a deterministic price-setting two-period duopoly model for differentiated products. When current market shares matter for future demand, cost-based dumping can be profitable. Dumping thus arises as a form of investment in market shares. This might trigger the application of anti-dumping law. We further show that correctly anticipated duties do not necessarily hinder firms from selling below costs. The mere existence of anti-dumping law, however, significantly changes the structure of the game, leading to higher first-period prices for both firms.