The paradox of human rights conditionality in EU trade policy: when strategic interests drive policy outcomes
The paradox of human rights conditionality in EU trade policy: when strategic interests drive policy outcomes
复制标题
欧盟贸易政策中人权条件的悖论：当战略利益驱动政策结果时
DOI：
10.1080/13501763.2018.1526203
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发表时间：
2018
影响因子：
4.2
通讯作者：
Lachlan Mckenzie
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Katharina L. Meissner;Lachlan Mckenzie
贸易议程正日益扩大，包括非商业目标，如促进基本政治和人权。虽然欧洲议会在缔结欧盟贸易协定时将自己定位为这些目标的倡导者，但它很少在谈判中坚持这些目标。然而，在与加拿大的谈判中，欧洲议会成功地对人权条件条款采取了坚韧立场。为什么欧洲议会投入政治资源坚持与加拿大--一个在基本权利方面排名前五的国家--达成协议的条件？我们认为，由于有限的组织能力，复合演员，如欧洲议会，必须选择“战略问题”的政治事件，使他们出现作为公共利益的独特支持者。在这种情况下，综合行为体在计算将政治资源投入政策问题的效用时，将突出性因素考虑在内。
ABSTRACT Increasingly, trade agendas are expanding to include non-commercial objectives such as the promotion of fundamental political and human rights. Although the European Parliament (EP) positions itself as an advocate of such objectives in the conclusion of European Union (EU) trade agreements, it rarely insists on them in negotiations. Yet, in the negotiations with Canada, the EP successfully took a tough stance on a human rights conditionality clause. Why did the EP invest political resources in insisting on conditionality in the agreement with Canada – a country which is among the top five regarding fundamental rights? We argue that, due to limited organizational capacity, composite actors, such as the EP, have to select ‘strategic issues’ among political events that make them appear as unique supporters of public interest. In this context, composite actors factor in saliency in their utility calculation of investing political resources in a policy issue.