Overconfidence and Moral Hazard
Overconfidence and Moral Hazard
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.979901
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发表时间：
2007-04
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影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Leonidas Enrique de la Rosa
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Leonidas Enrique de la Rosa
在这篇文章中，我在一个道德风险框架中研究了过度自信对激励契约的影响，在这个框架中，委托人和代理人故意持有关于他们企业成功概率的不对称信念。代理人过度自信可能会对均衡契约产生相互冲突的影响。一方面，过于自信的代理人不成比例地看重成功的或有报酬，因此更喜欢权力更大的激励。另一方面，如果代理人特别对他的行为影响成功可能性的程度过于自信，那么较低的激励力度足以诱导任何给定的努力水平。如果代理人总体上适度过度自信，则后一种效应占主导地位；因为在这种情况下，代理人承担的风险较小，他实际上受益于他的过度自信。如果代理人明显过于自信，则前者的影响占主导地位；然后代理人暴露在过大的风险中，这对他是有害的。过度自信的增加--无论是关于成功的基本概率还是努力对其影响的程度--使高水平的努力更有可能实现均衡。
In this paper, I study the effects of overconfidence on incentive contracts in a moral-hazard framework in which principal and agent knowingly hold asymmetric beliefs regarding the probability of success of their enterprise. Agent overconfidence can have conflicting effects on the equilibrium contract. On the one hand, an overconfident agent disproportionately values success-contingent payments, and thus prefers higher-powered incentives. On the other hand, if the agent is overconfident in particular about the extent to which his actions affect the likelihood of success, lower-powered incentives are sufficient to induce any given effort level. If the agent is overall moderately overconfident, the latter effect dominates; because the agent bears less risk in this case, he actually benefits from his overconfidence. If the agent is significantly overconfident, the former effect dominates; the agent is then exposed to an excessive amount of risk, which is harmful to him. An increase in overconfidence -- either about the base probability of success or the extent to which effort affects it -- makes it more likely that high levels of effort are implemented in equilibrium.