A new form of governance? comparing the open method of co-ordination to multilateral surveillance by the IMF and the OECD
A new form of governance? comparing the open method of co-ordination to multilateral surveillance by the IMF and the OECD
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新的治理形式？
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发表时间：
2006
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Armin Schäfer
中科院分区：
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作者：
Armin Schäfer
摘要开放式协调方法（OMC）在最近的欧盟文献中备受关注。主流观点认为，OMC不仅是一个新的，而且是一个有效的政策制定工具。本文通过比较三个国际组织的软法政策协调，对这两种说法提出了质疑。更具体地说，本文将欧洲就业战略与欧盟的广泛经济政策指导方针、经合组织经济调查和国际货币基金组织第四条磋商进行了比较。根据专家访谈，本报告试图表明，这些程序是多边监督的形式，在性质上没有区别。对OMC的这种比较分析驳斥了其新奇的说法。在比较了这四种程序之后，产生了一个由六个要素组成的更一般的多边监督模式，以便于进一步比较。本文的结论是，政府选择非政府组织的程序主要是为了确保自己的能力，而不是为了实现共同的目标。因此，有效解决问题不一定是软法律的主要目标。
Abstract The open method of co-ordination (OMC) has received much attention in the recent EU literature. The predominant view claims that the OMC is not only a new but also an effective policy-making instrument. This paper raises doubts about both claims by offering a comparison of soft law policy co-ordination in three international organizations. More specifically, this paper compares the European Employment Strategy to the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines of the EU, the OECD Economic Surveys, and the IMF Article IV Consultations. Based on expert interviews, it seeks to demonstrate that these procedures are forms of multilateral surveillance that do not differ in kind. Such a comparative analysis of the OMC refutes claims to its novelty. Having compared the four procedures, a more general model of multilateral surveillance consisting of six elements is generated that facilitates further comparisons. This paper concludes that governments select voluntarist procedures mainly to secure their own competencies rather than to realize common goals. Effective problem-solving is therefore not necessarily the dominant objective of soft law.