Dynamic Competition with Network Externalities: Why History Matters
Dynamic Competition with Network Externalities: Why History Matters
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与网络外部性的动态竞争：为什么历史很重要
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2335716
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发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Y. Yehezkel
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Hanna Halaburda;B. Jullien;Y. Yehezkel
本文研究了具有网络外部性的动态平台竞争问题。我们提出两个研究问题。第一个问题是信念优势如何随着时间的推移而延续，以及一个低质量的平台是否可以沿着时间保持其焦点位置。我们发现，对于非常高和非常低的折扣因子，低质量平台有可能无限期地保持其焦点位置。但对于中间折扣因素，更高质量的平台赢得并保持市场。第二个问题是，是什么推动了市场领导地位的沿着而变化（在许多市场上都可以观察到，比如智能手机和视频游戏机），以及这种变化如何作为动态均衡结果得到支持。我们提供两种解释。第一种解释依赖于内在均衡的不确定性。第二种解释依赖于技术的采用。人们可以预期，市场领导者的这种变化是平台之间激烈竞争的标志。然而，我们发现，领导层的变化表明价格竞争更加疲软。
This paper considers a dynamic platform competition in a market with network externalities. We ask two research questions. The first one asks how the beliefs advantage carries over in time, and whether a low-quality platform can maintain its focal position along time. We show that for very high and very low discount factors it is possible for the low-quality platform to maintain its focal position indefinitely. But for the intermediate discount factor the higher quality platform wins and keeps the market. The second question asks what drives changes in the market leadership along time (observed in many markets, like smartphones and video-game consoles), and how such changes can be supported as a dynamic equilibrium outcome. We offer two explanations. The first explanation relies on intrinsic equilibrium uncertainty. The second explanation relies on the adoption of technology. One could expect such change in the market leader to be a sign of intense competition between platforms. However, we find that changes in leadership indicate softer price competition.