Shape, perspective, and what is and is not perceived: Comment on Morales, Bax, and Firestone (2020).
Shape, perspective, and what is and is not perceived: Comment on Morales, Bax, and Firestone (2020).
复制标题
形状、视角以及感知到的和不感知到的东西：对 Morales、Bax 和 Firestone 的评论 (2020)。
DOI：
10.1037/rev0000363
复制
发表时间：
2023
影响因子：
5.4
通讯作者：
Burge,Tyler
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Burge,Johannes;Burge,Tyler
心理学和哲学长期以来一直在思考视角在视觉中的作用。自从现代视觉科学的曙光--大约是从19世纪晚期的亥姆霍兹开始--视觉的科学解释就集中在理解将感知到的视网膜图像转换成三维环境感知的计算上。科学中的标准观点是远端属性--环境的视点独立属性（物体形状）和视点相关的关系属性（相对于观看者的3D方向）--被感知地表示，而近端刺激的属性（在视觉中，视网膜图像）则没有。这一观点与知觉心理学中的科学解释的本质密不可分，并在过去150年中指导了令人印象深刻的进步。最近发表的一篇文章表明，在形状感知中，标准观点必须得到修正。在新的实验数据的基础上，本文提出了一个新的实体--透视形状--应该被引入到形状知觉的科学解释中。具体来说，该产品的中心广告声称，除了远端形状，透视形状被感知。我们认为这种说法是建立在一系列错误之上的。实验设计中的问题意味着，这篇文章没有为任何关于透视或形状感知的主张提供经验支持。在科学推理和概念发展方面还有进一步的问题。详述这些批评并解释科学如何对待这些问题，旨在澄清方法和理论，并促进科学与感知哲学之间的交流。（PsycInfo数据库记录（c）2023阿帕，保留所有权利）
Psychology and philosophy have long reflected on the role of perspective in vision. Since the dawn of modern vision science—roughly, since Helmholtz in the late 1800s—scientific explanations in vision have focused on understanding the computations that transform the sensed retinal image into percepts of the three-dimensional environment. The standard view in the science is that distal properties—viewpoint-independent properties of the environment (object shape) and viewpoint-dependent relational properties (3D orientation relative to the viewer)–are perceptually represented and that properties of the proximal stimulus (in vision, the retinal image) are not. This view is woven into the nature of scientific explanation in perceptual psychology, and has guided impressive advances over the past 150 years. A recently published article suggests that in shape perception, the standard view must be revised. It argues, on the basis of new empirical data, that a new entity—perspectival shape—should be introduced into scientific explanations of shape perception. Specifically, the article’s centrally advertised claim is that, in addition to distal shape, perspectival shape is perceived. We argue that this claim rests on a series of mistakes. Problems in experimental design entail that the article provides no empirical support for any claims regarding either perspective or the perception of shape. There are further problems in scientific reasoning and conceptual development. Detailing these criticisms and explaining how science treats these issues are meant to clarify method and theory, and to improve exchanges between the science and philosophy of perception.(PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved)