Revisiting games of incomplete information with analogy-based expectations
Revisiting games of incomplete information with analogy-based expectations
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DOI：
10.1016/j.geb.2007.06.006
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发表时间：
2008-03-01
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
Koessler, Frederic
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Jehiel, Philippe;Koessler, Frederic
本文研究了不完全信息静态二人博弈中基于类比的期望效应。玩家被假定为有限理性的方式，他们预测他们的对手的状态或有策略：他们捆绑成类比类的状态和发挥最佳反应，他们的对手的平均策略，在这些类比类。我们提供了基于类比的期望均衡的一般性质，并将该模型应用于各种知名的游戏。我们描述了不完全信息下协调博弈中成功协调的类比划分条件[Rubinstein，A.，1989.电子邮件游戏：“几乎常识”下的战略行为。Amer.Econ.Rev.79，385-391]，我们展示了接收器的类比分组如何可以促进Crawford和Sobel的廉价谈话游戏中的信息传输[Crawford，V. P.，Sobel，J.，1982.战略信息传递。Econometrica 50，1431-1451]，我们展示了类比分组如何在零和赌博游戏中产生赌博，比如那些为了说明无交易定理而研究的游戏。(c)2007年爱思唯尔公司All rights reserved.
This paper studies the effects of analogy-based expectations in static two-player games of incomplete information. Players are assumed to be boundedly rational in the way they forecast their opponent's state-contingent strategy: they bundle states into analogy classes and play best-responses to their opponent's average strategy in those analogy classes. We provide general properties of analogy-based expectation equilibria and apply the model to a variety of well known games. We characterize conditions on the analogy partitions for successful coordination in coordination games under incomplete information [Rubinstein, A., 1989. The electronic mail game: Strategic behavior under 'almost common knowledge'. Amer. Econ. Rev. 79, 385-391], we show how analogy grouping of the receiver may facilitate information transmission in Crawford and Sobel's cheap talk games [Crawford, V.P., Sobel, J., 1982. Strategic information transmission. Econometrica 50, 1431-1451], and we show how analogy grouping may give rise to betting in zero-sum betting games such as those studied to illustrate the no trade theorem. (c) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.