Diversionary Foreign Policy in Democratic Systems
Diversionary Foreign Policy in Democratic Systems
复制标题
民主制度下的牵制外交政策
DOI：
10.2307/2600934
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发表时间：
1996
影响因子：
2.6
通讯作者：
Alastair Smith
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Alastair Smith
本文考察了连任激励如何影响民主国家的外交决策。一个正式的模型描述了未来的选举前景如何影响政府采取冒险外交政策的决定。当政府被保证连任时，他们只会考虑国际因素，做出公正的决定。当政府不可能连任时，决策也同样不偏不倚。当选民对外交政策结果的评价可能对选举结果产生影响时，政府就会偏向暴力、冒险的外交政策项目。事实证明，制度约束可以减少这些偏见的严重程度。在选举周期结束时，外交政策决策的偏见会影响其他国家的决策。随着一个国家的选举周期接近尾声，其他国家对它的态度更倾向于和解，而不是那么对抗。随着内生危机的形成，该模型为民主国家更有可能在选举任期早期卷入战争这一经验现象提供了解释。
This article examines how reelection incentives influence foreign policy decision making in democratic states. A formal model characterizes how future electoral prospects affect a government's decision to undertake adventurous foreign policies. When governments are assured of reelection, they make unbiased decisions considering only international factors. Decision making is similarly unbiased when governments have no prospects of reelection. When the voters' evaluation of foreign policy outcomes could have an effect on election results then governments are biased towards violent, adventurous foreign policy projects. Institutional constraints are shown to reduce the magnitude of these biases. The bias in foreign policy decisions at the end of the electoral cycle influences decision making in other countries. As a nation approaches the end of its electoral cycle other nations are more conciliatory and less confrontational towards it. With endogenous crisis formation, the model provides an explanation for the empirical phenomenon that democracies are more likely to become involved in war early in their electoral term.