Getting It Right: Panel Error and the En Banc Process in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
Getting It Right: Panel Error and the En Banc Process in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
复制标题
正确处理：第九巡回上诉法院的专家组错误和全案程序
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2000
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Arthur D. Hellman
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Arthur D. Hellman
“为什么这么好的法官会犯这么多错误？“1999年7月在参议院司法委员会的一次听证会上提出的这个问题，很好地抓住了联邦上诉法院结构选择委员会最后报告中提出的主要论点之一。该委员会由退休的最高法院法官拜伦白色担任主席，建议国会将现有的第九巡回上诉法院分为三个“审判庭”，每个审判庭几乎都作为一个独立的上诉法院运作。委员会说，重组是必要的，因为“上诉法院的法律宣布职能需要比目前的第九巡回上诉法院更小的法官群体。”这一结论又是基于委员会的观点，即“较小的决策单位能够更有效地保持该单位法律的一致性和正确性。委员会的理由中提到“一致性”并不奇怪。第九巡回法院的批评者长期以来一直认为，一个大的上诉法院不可避免地难以保持其判决法的一致性;在接受这一观点时，委员会犁了熟悉的地面。新的是强调“正确性”。“如果证据表明，第九巡回上诉法院由于其规模而在维持其判决法的“正确性”方面受到阻碍，这将是一个支持重组的有力论据。因此，重要的是要检验命题的有效性。这就是本文所承担的任务。文章共分四个部分。第一部分提供了委员会建议的背景，并确定了两个可能的标准，以检验上诉法院小组裁决的“正确性”。第二部分假定，正确性是由美国最高法院的意见来衡量的。它审查了第九巡回上诉法院在最高法院的逆转记录，以确定该记录是否表明第九巡回上诉法院在执行其业务的方式上存在系统性失误。第三部分从巡回法庭内多数规则的角度考虑“正确性”。它侧重于第九巡回法院纠正异常小组决定的独特机制：“有限的银行法院”。文章最后对第九巡回法院的未来和第106届国会提出的三项立法提案进行了简要的评论。
"Why are judges [who are] so good making so many errors?" That question, posed at a hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee in July 1999, nicely captures one of the principal arguments made in the Final Report of the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals. The Commission, chaired by retired Supreme Court Justice Byron White, recommended that Congress divide the existing Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals into three "adjudicative divisions," each of which would operate almost as an independent appellate court. Restructuring is necessary, the Commission said, because "the law-declaring function of appellate courts requires groups of judges smaller than the present Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.” That conclusion, in turn, rested on the Commission's view that "a smaller decisional unit can more effectively maintain the coherence and correctness of the law of that unit. The reference to "coherence" in the Commission's rationale came as no surprise. Critics of the Ninth Circuit have long argued that a large court of appeals inevitably has difficulty maintaining consistency in its decisional law; in embracing that view, the Commission ploughed familiar ground. What is new is the emphasis on "correctness." If the evidence establishes that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is handicapped in maintaining the "correctness" of its decisional law by reason of its size, that would be a strong argument in favor of restructuring. It is therefore important to test the validity of the proposition. That is the task undertaken by this article. The article is in four parts. Part I provides background on the Commission proposal and identifies two possible standards for testing the "correctness" of a court of appeals panel decision. Part II posits that correctness is measured by the views of the United States Supreme Court. It examines the Ninth Circuit's record of reversals in the Supreme Court to determine whether that record points to systematic failings in the way the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals carries out its business. Part III considers "correctness" from the perspective of majority rule within the circuit. It focuses on the Ninth Circuit's unique mechanism for rectifying aberrant panel decisions: the "limited en banc court." The article concludes with brief observations on the future of the Ninth Circuit and the three legislative proposals introduced in the 106th Congress.