Rethinking the Greed–Grievance Nexus: Property Rights and the Political Economy of War in Sri Lanka
Rethinking the Greed–Grievance Nexus: Property Rights and the Political Economy of War in Sri Lanka
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重新思考贪婪与不满的关系：产权与斯里兰卡战争的政治经济学
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发表时间：
2005
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通讯作者：
B. Korf
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
B. Korf
有关内战的文献倾向于用“非此即彼”的对立术语来理解贪婪和不满。本文认为，在冲突的政治经济中，贪婪和不满可能存在因果关系并相互强化：战斗人员的战争（或影子）经济和平民的生存经济相互交织。冲突企业家和战争奸商所获得的收益加剧了人们对身份、经济不平等和缺乏政治权力的不满。一旦内战爆发（无论出于何种原因），战争的政治经济就会产生一种自我维持的依附主义逻辑，沿着感知的“朋友”和“敌人”的界限。这些分界线在日常的生存政治网络中得到强化。这种日常的庇护主义反过来又滋生了同样的不满言论。这些不满有助于增强人们争取“正义”的动力。这样，贪婪产生了怨气，反过来又稳定了战争经济，为贪婪的暴力企业家提供了经济机会。斯里兰卡内战背景下当地资源冲突的案例研究支持了这一主张。他们指出，由于内战以及国家和民间机构的崩溃，种族成为平民行为者主要通过任意权力获取可用资源的机制。平民因此成为“游戏”的一部分。实际上，这导致了“种族化权利”，即各族裔群体被不对称地赋予获取资源的讨价还价能力，具体取决于他们与武装分子的隶属关系以及各自的初始权力资源。这些种族化的权利满足了一些战争胜利者的贪婪，并加剧了失败者的不满。
The literature on civil wars tends to understand greed and grievances in antagonistic terms of ‘either–or’. This article suggests that in the political economy of conflict, greed and grievances may be causally linked and reinforce each other: war (or shadow) economies of combatants and the survival economies of civilians are intertwined. Gains made by conflict entrepreneurs and war profiteers feed grievances about identity, economic inequality, and lack of political power. Once civil war is onset (for whatever reason), the political economy of war produces a self-sustaining logic of clientelism along the lines of perceived ‘friends’ and ‘foes’. These dividing lines get reinforced in everyday political networks of survival. This everyday clientelism, in turn, nourishes grievance discourses along the same lines. These grievances contribute to heighten the motivation for people to fight for ‘justice’. In this way, greed produces grievances, which in turn stabilize the war economy and offer economic opportunities for greedy entrepreneurs of violence. Case studies from Sri Lanka on local resource conflicts in the context of civil war support this proposition. They indicate that because of the civil war and the breakdown of state and civic institutions, ethnicity becomes a mechanism for civilian actors to access resources available largely through arbitrary power. Civilians thus become part of the ‘game’. In effect, this leads to ‘ethnicized entitlements’, where the ethnic groups are asymmetrically endowed with bargaining power to access resources, depending upon their affiliation with militant actors and their respective initial power resources. These ethnicized entitlements satisfy greed for some war winners and feed grievances among those at the losing end.