Conservation Planning with Multiple Organizations and Objectives
Conservation Planning with Multiple Organizations and Objectives
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1523-1739.2010.01610.x
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发表时间：
2011-04-01
影响因子：
6.3
通讯作者：
Venter, Oscar
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Bode, Michael;Probert, Will;Venter, Oscar
全世界的保护组织数量急剧增加。现在，多个组织在同一景观中运作以追求不同的保护目标是很常见的。新的目标，如维持生态系统服务，将吸引更多的资金和新的组织来保护。系统的保护规划有助于设计空间上明确的管理行动，以最佳方式保护多种景观特征（例如，物种、生态系统或生态系统服务）。但是，在其应用中使用的方法隐含地假设一个单一的行动者执行最佳计划。我们调查了具有不同目标的自治执行组织的存在如何影响组织行为和保护结果。我们使用模拟模型和博弈论来探索替代行为（例如，组织独立行动或明确合作）影响了组织的能力，以保护他们的利益的功能，并调查了如何分布的功能在景观影响组织的合作态度。具有高度相关的空间分布的特征，虽然通常被认为是互利保护规划的机会，但可能导致组织互动，从而降低保护水平。这些有害的结果可以通过在获得土地时进行合作的组织来避免。然而，为了使合作购买有利于两个组织的目标，每个组织都必须放弃对它们认为具有高度养护价值的地块的保护。合作过程中产生的交易成本和保护资金的来源可以促进或阻碍合作行为。
There has been a dramatic increase in the number of conservation organizations worldwide. It is now common for multiple organizations to operate in the same landscape in pursuit of different conservation goals. New objectives, such as maintenance of ecosystem services, will attract additional funding and new organizations to conservation. Systematic conservation planning helps in the design of spatially explicit management actions that optimally conserve multiple landscape features (e.g., species, ecosystems, or ecosystem services). But the methods used in its application implicitly assume that a single actor implements the optimal plan. We investigated how organizational behavior and conservation outcomes are affected by the presence of autonomous implementing organizations with different objectives. We used simulation models and game theory to explore how alternative behaviors (e.g., organizations acting independently or explicitly cooperating) affected an organization's ability to protect their feature of interest, and investigated how the distribution of features in the landscape influenced organizations' attitudes toward cooperation. Features with highly correlated spatial distributions, although typically considered an opportunity for mutually beneficial conservation planning, can lead to organizational interactions that result in lower levels of protection. These detrimental outcomes can be avoided by organizations that cooperate when acquiring land. Nevertheless, for cooperative purchases to benefit both organizations' objectives, each must forgo the protection of land parcels that they would consider to be of high conservation value. Transaction costs incurred during cooperation and the sources of conservation funding could facilitate or hinder cooperative behavior.