Preferences for Collective Versus Individualised Wage Setting
Preferences for Collective Versus Individualised Wage Setting
复制标题
集体工资设定与个人工资设定的偏好
DOI：
10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02286.x
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发表时间：
2009
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
M. Burda
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
T. Boeri;M. Burda
均衡失业的标准模型假设外生劳动力市场制度和灵活的工资决定。本文对工资刚性和集体谈判进行内生建模，当工人因可观察到的技能不同而可能采用个性化或集体工资谈判时。在校准模型中，相当一部分工人和企业以及中间选民更喜欢集体谈判而不是权力下放的制度。要出现这种偏好，必须对以就业保护（解雇税）为代表的离职决策进行根本性扭曲。内生化集体谈判可以显着改变单一政权环境下政策的比较静态效应。
Standard models of equilibrium unemployment assume exogenous labour market institutions and flexible wage determination. This paper models wage rigidity and collective bargaining endogenously, when workers differ by observable skill and may adopt either individualized or collective wage bargaining. In the calibrated model, a substantial fraction of workers and firms as well as the median voter prefer collective bargaining to the decentralised regime. A fundamental distortion of the separation decision represented by employment protection (a firing tax) is necessary for such preferences to emerge. Endogenizing collective bargaining can significantly modify comparative statics effects of policy arising in a single-regime setting.